Since its announcement in 2021, Aukus has attracted hostility and skepticism. China has consistently claimed that the Australia-UK-US security deal was a dangerous move that exacerbated regional tensions. Some Western critics of Aukus suggest that its central project, the supply of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, may never come to fruition – and that achieving this goal must be a priority to maintain the credibility of the agreement.
Despite these criticisms, Aukus is gaining ground and gaining members. Last week, the defense chiefs of the Aukus countries announced that they were considering inviting Japan to participate in the development of new military technologies. Justin Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada, also spoke positively about developing ties with Aukus. The formal membership of Japan or Canada in Aukus – creating a Jaukus or a Caukus – is probably far from complete. But it is clear that both countries view Aukus as an important strategic partner.
China’s complaint that Aukus increased regional tensions takes the wrong direction. Beijing has invested money and resources into its military. China has also built military bases in the disputed waters of the South China Sea and stepped up its intimidation measures against its neighbors, including the Philippines, Japan, India and Taiwan.
Aukus is not the origin of these growing tensions. Instead, it is part of efforts to restore deterrence in the region by balancing China’s increased military power. But the most important question about Aukus is not whether it is justified, but whether it is sufficient – and whether it would retain its meaning if Donald Trump returned to power in the United States. Some analysts have called for the creation of an Asian equivalent of NATO – a mutual defense pact that would bring together all countries in the Indo-Pacific that feel potentially threatened by China or Russia.
-The different strategic and political cultures of potential partners make an Asian NATO virtually impossible. Japan’s constitution places serious limits on the country’s military. The diplomatic status of Taiwan – which is not recognized as an independent country by potential members of an Asian NATO – constitutes an additional complication. Aukus does not create an explicit mutual defense guarantee in the manner of NATO. It nevertheless helps to strengthen military, technological and strategic cooperation between like-minded nations.
The road to Australia’s eventual acquisition of nuclear-powered (but not nuclear-armed) submarines will be long and complicated. Australia will take delivery of second-hand nuclear submarines from the United States in the early 2030s. The new Aukus submarines, developed with Britain, will not be deployed until a decade later – date to which technology and politics may have evolved.
Nuclear submarines constitute the first and most important pillar of the Aukus pact. The second pillar, in which Japan and Canada are more likely to participate, concerns the development of new strategic technologies – in areas such as drone warfare, hypersonics, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence. Although Japan and Canada possess industrial prowess and essential minerals, it is not entirely clear how much they can contribute. The United States still leads the group in terms of advanced military technology.
A final criticism of Aukus, sometimes made in China or in the Global South, is that it is a retrospective attempt to preserve the power of the “Anglosphere”. But Japan’s association with the agreement undermines this idea. The fundamental link between the Aukus countries is that they are all liberal democracies, determined to prevent the Indo-Pacific from falling under the influence of an authoritarian China, in alliance with a revanchist Russia. Efforts to better collaborate on security are welcome. There is still work to be done.
